backend-common: added test to ensure malicious zip archives are handled

Signed-off-by: Patrik Oldsberg <poldsberg@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Patrik Oldsberg
2022-08-09 18:27:13 +02:00
parent 5e4dc173f7
commit cb24f975aa
2 changed files with 22 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ const archiveDataCorrupted = fs.readFileSync(
const archiveDataWithExtraDir = fs.readFileSync(
resolvePath(__filename, '../../__fixtures__/mock-with-extra-root-dir.zip'),
);
const archiveWithMaliciousEntry = fs.readFileSync(
resolvePath(__filename, '../../__fixtures__/mallory.zip'),
);
describe('ZipArchiveResponse', () => {
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -35,6 +38,7 @@ describe('ZipArchiveResponse', () => {
'/test-archive.zip': archiveData,
'/test-archive-with-extra-root-dir.zip': archiveDataWithExtraDir,
'/test-archive-corrupted.zip': archiveDataCorrupted,
'/test-archive-malicious.zip': archiveWithMaliciousEntry,
'/tmp': mockFs.directory(),
});
});
@@ -167,4 +171,22 @@ describe('ZipArchiveResponse', () => {
'invalid comment length. expected: 55. found: 0',
);
});
it('should throw on entries with a path outside the destination dir', async () => {
const stream = fs.createReadStream('/test-archive-malicious.zip');
const res = new ZipArchiveResponse(stream, '', '/tmp', 'etag');
await expect(res.files()).rejects.toThrow(
'invalid relative path: ../side.txt',
);
});
it('should throw on entries that attempt to write outside destination dir', async () => {
const stream = fs.createReadStream('/test-archive-malicious.zip');
const res = new ZipArchiveResponse(stream, '', '/tmp', 'etag');
await expect(res.dir()).rejects.toThrow(
'invalid relative path: ../side.txt',
);
});
});