fix(docs): Replace instances of UrlReader with UrlReaderService
Also update the service names in threat-model.md Signed-off-by: Łukasz Jernaś <lukasz.jernas@allegro.com>
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@@ -41,13 +41,13 @@ The built-in protection against unauthorized access does not by default include
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## Common Backend Configuration
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There are many common facilities that are configured centrally and available to all Backstage backend plugins. For example there is a `DatabaseManager` that provides access to a SQL database, `SchedulerService` for scheduling long-running tasks, `Logger` as a general logging facility, and `UrlReader` for reading content from external sources. These are all configured either directly in code, or within the `backend` block of the static configuration. The appropriate care needs to be taken to ensure that any secrets remain confidential and no malicious configuration is injected.
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There are many common facilities that are configured centrally and available to all Backstage backend plugins. For example there is a `DatabaseService` that provides access to a SQL database, `SchedulerService` for scheduling long-running tasks, `LoggerService` as a general logging facility, and `UrlReaderService` for reading content from external sources. These are all configured either directly in code, or within the `backend` block of the static configuration. The appropriate care needs to be taken to ensure that any secrets remain confidential and no malicious configuration is injected.
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In a typical Backstage setup, there is no boundary between plugins that run on the same host. Likewise, there is no boundary between plugins that share the same database access. Any plugin that is running on a host that has access to the logical database of any other plugin should be considered to have full access to that other plugin. For example, even if you deploy the `auth` and `catalog` plugins on separate hosts with separate configuration and credentials, the `catalog` plugin is still considered to have full access to the `auth` plugin as long as the `catalog` plugin has access to the `auth` plugin's logical database. The only way to create a boundary between the two plugins is to deploy them in such a way that they do not have access to each others’ database. This applies to the database facility as well as any other shared resources, such as the cache.
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The `UrlReader` facility is of particular interest for a secure Backstage configuration. In particular the `backend.reading.allow` configuration lists the hosts that you trust the backend to be able to read content from on behalf of users. It is extremely important that this list does not, for example, allow access to instance metadata endpoints of cloud providers, or other endpoints that your Backstage instance may have access to which contain sensitive information. In general it is recommended to keep the list minimal and only allow reading from required endpoints. The same concerns apply to custom implementations of the `UrlReader` interface, if you need to implement these through code.
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The `UrlReaderService` facility is of particular interest for a secure Backstage configuration. In particular the `backend.reading.allow` configuration lists the hosts that you trust the backend to be able to read content from on behalf of users. It is extremely important that this list does not, for example, allow access to instance metadata endpoints of cloud providers, or other endpoints that your Backstage instance may have access to which contain sensitive information. In general it is recommended to keep the list minimal and only allow reading from required endpoints. The same concerns apply to custom implementations of the `UrlReader` interface, if you need to implement these through code.
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Note that the `UrlReader` system operates with a service context and is not integrated with the Backstage permission system or other external access control mechanisms. This means users of your Backstage instance may be able to read external content which that individual should not have access to. For example, the `$text` placeholder in a `catalog-info.yaml` can be used to read contents from a source such as a GitHub repository that the user does not have direct access too. If this is a concern it is recommended to either disable or replace the resolvers in the catalog placeholder processor and similar features in any other plugin.
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Note that the `UrlReaderService` system operates with a service context and is not integrated with the Backstage permission system or other external access control mechanisms. This means users of your Backstage instance may be able to read external content which that individual should not have access to. For example, the `$text` placeholder in a `catalog-info.yaml` can be used to read contents from a source such as a GitHub repository that the user does not have direct access too. If this is a concern it is recommended to either disable or replace the resolvers in the catalog placeholder processor and similar features in any other plugin.
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## Authentication
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